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Tactical Napoleonic Warfare
Anyone interested in designing a miniatures rule set on Napoleonic warfare should find the following facts of at least some interest & perhaps useful. The most important references include the following: Imperial Bayonets by George Nafziger. Tactics & Grand Tactics of the Napoleonic Wars, by George W Jeffrey. Weapons & Equipment of the Napoleonic Wars, by Philip J Haythornwaite. A Year at War 1809, by C A Sapherson. With Musket, Cannon and Sword, by Brent Nosworthy. Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon, by Roy Muir. Firepower, by BP Hughes.
Click on this link for an article on the Russian Army: Russian Army
Troop Frontages
The space allotted for an infantryman in the ranks & between the ranks was:
Country Width Interval between ranks
Austria ??? 2 paces (40 ins)
Britain 22 ins 1 pace
France 26 ins 13 ins
Prussia ??? 26 ins
Russia 27 ins 14 ins
The dimensions of line infantry in line of battle at full theoretical strength was:
Country Year Battalion Length
Austria 1807 228 to 254 yds
Britain 1792 213
France 1791 187
France 1808 160
Prussia 1792 120
Prussia 1808 115
Russia 1802 123
The above are the theoretical frontages as sited by Nafziger. Nosworthy states that those based on a frontage of 22 inches per man (Britain) should be increased by 25% as under actual battlefield conditions, as opposed to parade ground conditions, the frontage per man was 27 to 30 inches.
Infantry was deployed in 3 ranks (3 men deep) except for Great Britain & some of her allies which used a 2 rank formation. In 1813 Napoleon issued plans for the elimination of the 3rd rank from the French army. I do not believe that this was widely implemented.
For cavalry & artillery I have been unable to locate the frontages for individual countries. The French regulations state that 12 files should occupy a space of 9 to 10 meters. This works out to 29 to 33 inches frontage per horse. George Jefferies says a cavalry squadron of 150 men, deployed in two ranks would have a frontage of 100 yards (48 inches per horse.) Hence a regiment of 6 squadrons would have a frontage of 600 yards. Cavalry was generally deployed in two ranks. Artillery guns were placed every 12 to 20 yards giving a 6 gun battery a frontage of 72 to 120 yards.
Movement Rates
Infantry movement rates by country are as follows:
Country Paces per Minute Yards per Minute
Austria Ordinairschritt 90-95 63-66
Geschwindschritt 105 73
Doubleirschritt 120 83
France Pas ordinaire 76 55
Pas de route 85-90 61-65
Pas accelere 100 72
Pas de manoeuvre 120 87
Pas de charge 120 87
Britain Ordinary Pace 75 63
Quick Pace 108 90
Prussia Ordinaire schritt 75 52
Geschwindschritt 108 63
Russia Tchyi szag 60-70 50-58
Skoryi szag 100-110 83-92
Udwonyi szag 140-160 117-133
Apparently the Russians used the "goose step" & one must wonder if they were ever able to march at the fastest rates listed for any distance. The French & Prussians marched with a locked knee with the foot swung forward as if to kick the leg of the man in front. The fastest paces were only used over short distances by almost all troops. The French Old Guard was able to charge 300 yards & maintain order, but this was considered to be most remarkable.
Both the French & Prussian systems contained a back-step that was a pace of 12 inches. This was only used to make minor tactical adjustments. An oblique step was used to angle to the left or right. When using it troops would move at an angle of 22.5 degrees from their front. The step was shorter, covering about 1.5 feet, & the slower pace was used. French troops would advance at about 40 yards per minute when obliquing & other nations at about 37 yards per minute.
A short-step of about 12 inches was apparently allowed for & one must suspect that it was frequently used on the uneven fields on which battles were normally fought. The calculated infantry rates of advance using it are as follows:
Rate of March France Britain
Ordinary Step 25 yds/min 25 yds/min
Quick Step 33 36
Charge Step 40 40
Personally I suspect that these slower movement rates would have frequently been used on the battlefield. George Nafziger states that the medium cadences of 100 to 120 paces per minute were the most popular on the battlefield in the years from 1792 to 1815. I would assume that columns on good ground would use this rate whereas lines would have a tendency to use the slower rates on all types of ground.
I have found only two references regarding the movement rates of artillery. They state that a French horse artillery team walked at 86 meters per minute, trotted at 189, & galloped at 200 or 370 meters per minute.
The French regulations list cavalry movement rates as follows:
Walk 97-107 meters per minute
Trot 194-214 meters per minute
Gallop 300 meters per minute
Cavalry Charges
Whatever formation may be adopted for an attack, cavalry would follow a set sequence in accelerating its movement during a charge. The speed of the cavalry would increase as it approached the enemy. The distance at which a more rapid pace was adopted varied by country.
Walk Trot Gallop Charge
France ??? ??? 190 yds 65 yds
Prussia pre 1806 830 yds 790 to 625 yds 540 to 375 yds 250 to 165 yds
Prussia 1812 665 to 500 yds ???? 183 yds 85 yds
Britain ???? ???? 250 yds 80 yds
Haythornthwaite summarizes in saying that in most armies the cavalry would trot 1/3 of the distance to the enemy, then canter, then break into a gallop at a distance of 150 yards, & finally charge at full speed at 50 yards.
Cavalry attacks were generally to be made with at least 2 lines, with the second line acting as a reserve. After conducting its attack the first line would fall back behind the second to rally while the second line attacked. The fall back could be conducted by a passage of lines in which the second line would open up intervals for the first to fall back through or by the troopers of the first line flowing back around the flanks of the second.
Favorite formations for attacking cavalry included the line with a main battle line & a reserve line. The echelon attack in which the squadrons were formed in line but with each squadron being staggered back slightly behind the squadron to its flank (left or right.) An echiquier attack also had squadrons staggered behind one another but they alternated checkerboard fashion. An attack in column was primarily used against infantry.
Visibility
The following notes are taken primarily from Haythornwaite, but it appears that the other sources are in agreement. Pages 24 & 25 of the latest edition of BP Hughes text contains some wonderful pictures demonstrating the target produced by a line of men at various ranges.
Masses of troops may be seen at 1700 yards (about 1 mile.)
Infantry may be distinguished from cavalry at 1300 yards.
Crossbelts & white trousers are visible at 700 yards.
Uniforms, face, & body movements visible at 500 yards.
Officers may be distinguished at 200 to 250 yards.
Artillery Fire
Guns were organized into batteries that generally contained from 4 to 14 guns each with 6 or 8 being the most common number. In foot batteries the guns were pulled by horses with the gunners walking while in horse batteries all troops were mounted.
When a battery deployed for battle the guns were placed in a staggered line (staggered to prevent a lucky flank shot from doing too much damage) with the guns at 15 yard or so intervals. The caissons associated with the battery were kept about 18 yards behind the guns according to Nafziger but a full 50 yards behind the guns according to Haythornwaite. There was also a second line of caissons further back along with other vehicles. When a battery limbered up or changed facing then all of these associated units had to also move or change facing.
Estimating the effectiveness of artillery on the battlefield is not at all easy. Extensive data exists from tests conducted by the Royal artillery, by William Muller & by the Madras Artillery of the Honourable East India Company. Muller gives us an estimate of 48 casualties inflicted upon a cavalry regiment approaching & charging a single 6 pdr from a distance of around 1700 yards & of 138 casualties for an infantry battalion beginning its approach at the same distance. All of the modern day writers seem doubtful that these casualty rates could actually be achieved. BP Hughes states that fire would not begin at such a long range & that Muller used to high a rate of fire in his calculations.
The Madras field tests give a theoretical hit % by a 6 pdr or 12 pdr as follows: (Interpolated from BP Hughes charts)
Gun 400 yds 600 yds 900 yds 1200 yds
6 pdr 60% 60% 55% 35%
12 pdr 75% 70% 60% 35%
Great uncertainties relate in transferring field tests to the battlefield. The following are a few statements by the authors listed above relating to the effectiveness of artillery.
A well sited gun should produce between 60 & 120 casualties per hour of engagement & each shot from a well sited gun could be expected to produced 1 to 1.5 casualties.
Clausewitz at least felt that artillery was more effective than infantry. He estimated that a battery with 1/3 the frontage of an infantry battalion & 1/8 the number of men was capable of causing 2 to 3 times the damage as an infantry battalion.
BP Hughes states that a salvo of case fired by a full battery would produce the same number of hits as a single volley by an infantry battalion. The advantage of the case was that it had a greater range.
Muller states that a 6 lb shot was 50% more effective than a 3 lb shot & that a 12 lb shot was twice as effective as a 6 lb shot.
While artillery could theoretically fire at up to 8 to 9 times per minute the maximum rate of fire was generally limited to 2 to 3 rounds per minute. Based on the typical number of rounds carried this allows for 60 to 90 minutes of fire at the maximum rate. There does seem to be a consensus of opinion that the maximum practical effective range of field guns was 1000 yards. In general it appears that the use of canister was limited to ranges under 500 yards with the maximum range of light case being 250 yards. The British limited all case to a range of 350 yards. The disadvantage of canister was that it had very little penetration & would generally only injure soldiers in the front rank.
While BP Hughes is the modern authority on firepower I would recommend Muir's book as giving the best overview.
Next will be a discussion of musketry.
John P Kelly
May 18, 2001
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